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Abstract
We explore the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy
credibility when both must be self-supporting. Our arguments are presented in the context of a
two-country, two-period model of dynamic emission abatement with transboundary pollution,
where government policies suffer from a time-consistency problem. In the absence of
repeated interaction, any form of coordination - between governments, and between
governments and their respective private sectors - improves policy making. Nevertheless,
under repeated interaction international policy spillovers can make it possible to overcome the
domestic credibility problem; and, conversely, the inability to precommit to policy
domestically can help support international policy cooperation.
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the ESRC.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the literature on rules versus discretion,1 it is often informally argued that interna-
tional agreements, by making domestic policy changes more di¢cult to reverse, could
enhance the credibility of policymakers when domestic policy commitment devices are
not available.2 Figure 1, where we plot the World Bank indicator of institutional credi-
bility3 against membership (or not) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) for seventy
countries, seems to support such a claim: on average, WTO members score a higher cred-
ibility index than non-members.4 This argument, however, runs against the observation
that international agreements are themselves not directly enforceable: absent a suprana-
tional authority with autonomous powers of enforcement, international agreements need
to be sustained by the threat of credible punishment between the parties involved.5 If
international agreements are not automatically binding, one could actually conjecture a
reverse linkage between domestic policy credibility and international agreements, namely
that a lack of domestic commitment might make it more di¢cult to undertake commit-
ments vis-à-vis international partners. Indeed, this is an alternative interpretation of the
pattern shown in Figure 1.
1The idea that policy discretion might provide governments with an incentive to renege on earlier
promises, that this incentive could undermine the sustainability of optimal government policies, and that
the adherence to policy rules might restore the credibility and therefore lead to preferred outcomes, was
introduced in the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1977). The most in‡uential applications of
this idea have been in monetary and …scal policy (see Persson and Tabellini [1994] for a review), but time
inconsistency issues have been shown to arise in most areas of economics, including international trade
(e.g. Staiger and Tabellini [1987], Matsuyama [1990], and Tornell [1991]) and environmental policy (e.g.
La¤ont and Tirole [1996]).
2For example, Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and Matsuyama (1990) suggest that time inconsistency
problems in trade policy could be overcome if countries could undertake binding commitments through
the GATT/WTO. In a more recent paper, Staiger and Tabellini (1999) …nd that GATT rules did indeed
help the US government to make domestic trade policy commitments to its private sector.
3This index—which range from 1 (worst) to 6 (best)—captures the credibility of governments’ policy
announcements. It was constructed by the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation on
the basis of a private sector survey conducted during 1996-1998 in seventy-four countries (see Brunetti
et al. [1998]).
4The empirical evidence on this question is otherwise scant. There have been empirical studies focusing
on the relationship between price in‡ation, central bank independence, and membership in a monetary
union (e.g., Cukierman [1992]); but we are not aware of any systematic cross-country examination of the
relationship between domestic policy credibility and membership in international agreements.
5For example, the WTO cannot directly punish violations and can only authorize member countries
to retaliate against violators. The idea that international agreements must be self-enforcing has been












Figure 1: Domestic Credibility and WTO Membership
This paper explores the linkage between international agreements and domestic pol-
icy credibility when both must be self-supporting. The paper’s main contribution is to
show that the need to internalize international policy spillovers through a self-enforcing
international agreement may help governments to overcome domestic policy credibility
problems in policy choices, and, conversely, the need to sustain policy reputation with the
private sector may help governments to support policy coordination with one another;
consequently, reducing the scope for repeated strategic interaction by means of a binding
partial coordination mechanism—such as a (hypothetically) binding international agree-
ment or a domestic policy commitment device—may make it more di¢cult to support
e¢cient policies. We also show that, when the international policy coordination prob-
lem and the policy credibility problem are not too severe, a simultaneous increase in the
severity of both problems can be bene…cial to self-enforcing policy coordination.
The general conclusion one can draw from these results is that when international
agreements and domestic policy credibility must both be self-supporting, causation be-
tween them can ‡ow in either direction: self-supporting international agreements can
boost domestic policy credibility, and, vice versa, the need to sustain domestic policy
reputation can help international cooperation. But co-causation is also possible: self-
supporting international agreements and domestic policy credibility can complement each
other, working together to help support e¢cient policies.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper in the literature to analyze the
two-way relationship between the credibility of domestic institutions and international
policy cooperation under repeated interaction. Earlier related studies by Rogo¤ (1985a)
and Kehoe (1989) have focused on the e¤ects of binding (i.e. non self-enforcing) policy co-
ordination between governments on time-consistent policy choices within a single round of
interaction. What our analysis shows, however, is that the manner in which partial bind-
ing coordination a¤ects cooperation under repeated strategic interaction does not mirror
2its e¤ects within a single round of interaction. Thus, whether horizontal coordination—
between governments—and vertical coordination—between governments and their respec-
tive private sectors—are binding or self-supporting matters a great deal for how they
interact with each other.
2 Policy without Repeated Interaction
We develop our arguments by focusing on the case of environmental taxes. There is
evidence both in the United States and in Europe suggesting that environmental pol-
icy su¤ers from a credibility problem: politicians have often pledged to introduce tough
environmental policies but then adopted much softer policies.6 There are also indica-
tions that this credibility problem stems from a tension between the goal of encouraging
innovation and investment in environment-friendly technologies on the one hand and
distributional concerns on the other: the prospect of future environmental taxes is instru-
mental to induce …rms to undertake abatement-related investment; environmental taxes,
however, produce unwanted distributional e¤ects,7 which are di¢cult to o¤set through
compensation.8 Then, once innovation has taken place, policymakers are driven to reduce
environmental taxes in order to minimize their distributional e¤ects.9 As private investors
recognize the ex-post incentives of policymakers, the promise of high future emission taxes
is not credible.10
Our analysis focuses on an in…nitely-repeated policy game between governments, where
two symmetric countries are linked by transboundary pollution externalities and where
pollution abatement requires investment by the private sector. In order to focus on the
6For example, according to the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) “there have been many words
but little concrete change” in the EU taxation of energy products. A proposal to increase EU environ-
mental taxes was put forward in 1997 has not yet been adopted and has been amended to introduce many
exemptions for sectors which are more sensitive than others to energy prices (see www.eeb.org).
7Most energy and environmental taxes are well known to be regressive, since poorer people pay a
disproportionate share of their income in these taxes relative to richer people (for example, see Poterba
[1991], OECD [1995], and Metcalf [1999]).
8Compensation schemes typically run against incentive-compatibility problems. For example, grandfa-
thering rules in the allocation of emission permits amongst …rms can in principle neutralize distributional
e¤ects, but require veri…cation of past emissions, which can generate ex-ante incentives for …rms to
increase emissions.
9In 2000, for example, truckers forced the UK government to roll back fuel taxes after successfully
managing to disrupt automotive fuel distribution across the UK for almost a month.
10Much of the existing literature has focused on credibility problems arising from e¢ciency considera-
tions only. An exception is Pearce and Stacchetti (1997), who analyze time-consistent taxation when a
government cares about both e¢ciency and distribution.
3environmental policy dimension, we assume that there is no trade.11 The stage game con-
sists of the following sequence: …rst the private sector selects levels of pollution-reducing
investment on the basis of expected emission taxes; then governments choose emission
taxes and pollution abatement decisions are …nalized. Emission taxes are the only avail-
able policy instrument, and produce adverse distributional e¤ects because di¤erent agents
have di¤erent consumption requirements of the polluting good. Thus, when setting emis-
sion taxes governments trade o¤ e¢ciency and distributional objectives; however, since
taxes are chosen after investment decisions are made, e¤ects on investment will not be
accounted for. This gives rise to a domestic commitment problem: in the absence of
repeated interaction, the taxes chosen ex post by each government will be below their
unilaterally optimal levels.
In this model, policy formation su¤ers from a vertical coordination problem between
government and private sector, stemming from governments’ inability to precommit to
a certain level of emission taxation, as well as from a horizontal coordination problem
between governments, stemming from the presence of transboundary emission spillovers.
This section describes the stage game, and examines policy formation within a single
round of interaction. Subsequent sections will focus on repeated interaction over an in…nite
horizon.
2.1 Pollution Abatement and Investment
In each country consumers consume a …xed amount [ of a certain good, which can be
produced by two alternative methods: a “dirty” technology, which produces one unit of
the good at a constant marginal cost of unity while generating one unit of environmental
emissions; and a clean technology, which generates no emissions but involves a marginal
cost in excess of unity and requires some investment in the …rst period. If a total amount
Y of the good is produced using the clean technology, total domestic emissions are
H = [ ¡ Y= (1)
The government levies a tax w per unit of emissions, which makes the gross-of-tax price of
the polluting good and the net-of-tax price of its clean substitute both equal to s =1+w.
Revenues from environmental taxation, U = wH,a r ea s s u m e dt ob er e t u r n e dt ot h e
consumers in equal shares in a lump-sum fashion.
There are q domestic …rms having access to the clean technology. The long-run cost
of producing an amount y for a certain …rm through the clean technology is assumed to
11For an analysis of the interaction between trade and environmental policies in a game theoretical
setting where international agreements are constrained to be self-enforcing, see Ederington (2001b).
4be quadratic in y for all …rms:





The …rst component of f(y) (the linear term) does not involve any capital costs for any
of the …rms. In contrast, for a fraction  (0 ·  · 1) of the abating …rms, the second
component (the quadratic term) represents input costs for a combination of abatement-
speci…c capital inputs and other inputs.12 We shall call these the capital-intensive …rms.
For these, the two inputs must be combined in …xed proportions: n units of capital for
every 1 ¡ n units of other inputs, where 0 · n · 1.13 Thus the indirect demand for




2 ´ l(y)= (3)
The remaining fraction 1 ¡  of …rms do not use capital inputs (i.e., for these …rms, the
quadratic component of costs only involves current inputs).
If the private sector foresees a tax w, the expected pro…ts to a …rm from producing an





2 ´ v(y>w)> (4)
and the …rst-order condition for a pro…t-maximizing abatement choice is
w ¡ #y =0 > (5)
which implies that pollution abatement, y, by a …rm will take place up to the point where
marginal abatement costs equal marginal abatement bene…ts. This identi…es a function
y(w)=w@# linking the privately optimal aggregate level of abatement by a …rm to the
tax. In spite of their di¤erent technologies, if …rms of both types correctly foresee the tax,
they will select the same level of abatement and obtain the same pro…ts.
12Investment in R&D and new equipment is the principal means by which pollution abatement takes
place. Examples are the development of energy-e¢cient engine designs to reduce emissions by vehicles,
the construction of re…nery equipment to produce unleaded gasoline, or the installation of water cleaning
equipment by chemical manufacturers. Estimates presented by the European Commission from studies
carried out by several research institutions show that a European Carbon tax can only be e¤ective in
reducing CO2 emissions if accompanied by substantial investment and innovation (DRI, 1992). Also,
investment in emission-reducing projects plays a central role in the Kyoto Protocol through the Joint
Implementation mechanism (Art. 6.1) and the Clean Development Mechanism (Art. 12).
13This speci…cation amounts to assuming Leontie¤ homothetic primal technologies.
52.2 Consumption, Damage, and Welfare
In each country, the population comprises k consumers of two types, D and E,e a c hp r e s e n t
in equal numbers (k@2), and individually endowed with exogenous income levels equal to
pD and pE, respectively. Consumers all have equal stakes in production activities, imply-
ing that the total pro…ts from abatement, V, are distributed uniformly in the population.
Disposable income for each individual of type m is then |m = pm +( V + wH)@k, m = D>E.
Consumption takes place in the second period and it is assumed that individuals spend
a …xed amount of their income on the pollution generating commodity—{m = m[@k,
m = D>E,w i t hD + E =2 —and spend the rest of their income on other non-polluting
goods, in amounts equal to fm = |m ¡ {m.14 In the rest of our discussion, we shall assume
D A E.15
Emissions are transboundary. The valuation of environmental damage by a represen-




[(1 ¡ )H + H
¤]> (6)
where H¤ denotes emissions by foreign …rms, and where  (0 ·  · 1)r e p r e s e n t st h e
extent to which environmental damage is transboundary. Environmental damage is as-
sumed to be additively separable in preferences. The (indirect) utility of consumers of




¡(1 + w)m[ + V + wH ¡ [(1 ¡ )H + H¤]
k
>m = D>E= (7)
We wish to represent a situation where environmental taxes have undesirable distribu-
tional e¤ects, i.e., where the distribution of welfare under w =0is viewed by society as
being desirable (so that emission taxes would not independently be used to pursue distri-
butional objectives in the absence of environmental costs). This can be captured simply
by specifying endowments as pD = pE +( E ¡ D)[@k,s ot h a tw =0implies xD = xE
and wA0 implies xD ?x E; thus, any increase in w from zero will skew the distribution of
welfare against group D.16
14Formally, such demand patterns are consistent with preferences that can be represented in terms of
a utility function of the form x({m>f m)=minf{m ¡ m[@k>0g + fm, m = D>E,f o r su¢ciently large.
15For example, group D could be identi…ed with the rural population, who consume comparatively
more automotive fuel.
16Much of the debate on the redistributive costs of environmental taxation revolves around the dif-
ferential impacts these taxes can have across productive sectors, rather than consumers. A structure
analogous to the one described here arises if ownership of the factors associated with the production of
either the dirty or clean variety is concentrated within the economy. Then an increase in the tax would
alter factor returns and would be distributionally nonneutral.
6If we then assume the government’s objective to be a weighted linear combination of
individual utilities, Z(xD>x E)=k(zDxD + zExE), we can represent inequality aversion
by attaching a premium  to the utility of the less favored group (type D if we assume
D A E) and specifying normalized weights as zD =( 1+)@(2 + )>zE =1 @(2 + ).17
The government’s payo¤, as a function of the domestic tax and of the foreign level of
abatement, can thus be expressed as
¦(w>Y






where Y (w) and Y ¤ are total domestic and foreign abatement when all …rms correctly
forecast the tax and  = ¡[(1 ¡ D)@(2 + ) A 0 is a constant.18 The term w in
(8) represents the distributional cost of emission taxes; we shall assume that this e¤ect
cannot be neutralized by any available compensation mechanism.19
2.3 Second-Best and Time-Consistent Emission Taxes
If the government can credibly precommit to a level of emission tax in the second period,
it will select a tax w which maximizes (8). This yields
w =( 1¡ ) ¡ != (9)
In this unilateral second-best solution, the concern for reducing the environmental damage
associated with emissions is weighed against the distributional cost of higher emission
taxes.20 Notice that this ex-ante optimal tax is independent of n and .
If, however, the government cannot credibly precommit to a certain level of emission
taxation, the tension between e¢ciency and distributional goals combines with the dy-
namic dimension of pollution abatement to give rise to a time-inconsistency problem in
17This formulation can be derived from a hybrid Utilitarian/Rawlsian symmetric social welfare (or
political support) function of the form Z(x1>===>xk)=m i n lf(1 + )xl +
P
o6=k xog.
18The full expression for social welfare also includes a constant term ¤=k(zDpD+zEpE)¡(DzD+
EzE)[+((1¡)[+[¤). For the sake of notational simplicity, we renormalize payo¤s omitting the
constant ¤; this has no implications for our subsequent analysis, which only involves payo¤ di¤erences.
19A consumption subsidy lowering the price of both the dirty good and its clean substitute could in
principle neutralize the e¤ects of the emission tax. Such a scheme, however, would not be feasible if the
level of consumption of the clean substitute (re‡ecting how consumers substitute away from the polluting
good) is either unobservable or nonveri…able; or it may not be viable if the social opportunity cost of the
public funds required for such a subsidy is prohibitively high (e.g., because of high marginal e¢ciency
costs from raising revenues through other taxes).
20In the discussion that follows, we shall restrict our attention to scenarios featuring an interior uni-
lateral solution where (1 ¡ ) ¡ ! A 0.
7the choice of emission taxes. The reason is that, once capital-intensive …rms have in-
stalled a certain amount of investment, private abatement choices become less responsive
to changes in the tax than they are ex ante; then, because of the adverse distributional
costs of taxation, the government will be induced ex post to select a tax which is less than
the one it would have committed to ex ante.
Formally, suppose that investors foresee a tax ~ w. Then each capital-intensive …rm
would install an amount of capital, l(~ w)=( 1 @2)n#(y(~ w))2 = n(~ w)2@(2#).O n c el = l(~ w) is
installed, the cost of capital investment will be sunk, and the maximum possible level of
abatement for a capital-intensive …rm will be [2l(~ w)@(n#)]1@2 = ~ w@#. Thus, for any level of
abatement less than ~ w@# the marginal cost of abatement to a capital-intensive …rm will be
reduced to (1¡n)#y; on the other hand, the marginal cost of abatement for y ¸ ~ w@# will
be in…nity. Thus, capital-intensive …rms will each choose a level of abatement for which
w =( 1¡n)#y, i.e. y = w@[(1¡n)#], if this level is less than or equal to ~ w@#; and will choose
y = ~ w@# otherwise.21 So the short-run abatement response by each of the capital-intensive
…rms—as a function of the tax ~ w on which investment choices were based and of the tax









´ ^ yn(w>~ w)= (10)
The remaining …rms, which do not use capital as an input, will each choose an abatement
level y(w)=w@#. What the above implies is that the ex-post abatement choice by capital-
intensive …rms is constrained by the installed capacity, but a lower tax is required to
induce a given abatement level by capital intensive …rms, if this level is below the installed
capacity. Then, if the government selects a tax that maximizes welfare after a level of
investment l = l(~ w) is installed by each capital-intensive …rm, it will be tempted to lower
the tax so as to reduce its distributional e¤ects.
In the Appendix, we derive the solution for the government’s ex-post optimal choice
of tax, as a function of the tax that was expected by investors ex ante:
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21Since pro…ts are concave and since they reach an unconstrained maximum at y = w@[(1 ¡ n)#],i f
the latter is greater than ~ w@# we must have that pro…ts are increasing at y = ~ w@#, and this choice will
therefore be a constrained optimum for the …rm.
22In what follows, we use a “hat” (“^”) to denote a divergence between the taxes expected by capital-
intensive …rms and the taxes chosen by the policymakers.
8The optimum ex-post choice thus falls under one of three possible regimes: (i) regime
^ w(~ w)=w0 corresponds to an optimum where neither …rm type is capacity-constrained;
(ii) in regime ^ w(~ w)=w00, the tax is set at a level that is just high enough to induce
capital-intensive …rms to operate at capacity, i.e. such that capital-intensive …rms would
respond to a marginal tax reduction but not to a marginal tax increase; (iii) in regime
^ w(~ w)=w000, capital-intensive …rms operate at capacity and their abatement choices are fully
unresponsive to marginal tax changes in either direction.
>From (11) it can be immediately seen that, if the anticipated tax, ~ w,i se q u a lt ot h e
second-best choice, i.e. ~ w =( 1¡)¡!, then the ex-post optimal tax will be less than ~ w
(w0, w00,a n dw000 are all less than (1¡)¡! in that case); thus, the ex-ante second-best tax
cannot constitute a credible promise. In a perfect-foresight equilibrium, where investors
correctly anticipate the ex-post optimal choice of the government, we must have ~ w = ^ w(~ w).
It is easy to verify that the only value of ~ w that satis…es the above …xed-point condition—
the time-consistent level of taxation—for nA0 is ~ w = w000 =( 1¡ ) ¡ !@(1 ¡ ) if this
expression is positive, and ~ w =0otherwise.23 Therefore, the unilateral second-best level
of emission taxation cannot be sustained in the absence of a commitment mechanism.24
2.4 One-Shot Uncoordinated and Coordinated Policy Outcomes
If  =0no policy credibility problem arises. We can interpret this case as representing a
scenario where all …rms use only current inputs in abatement, or, alternatively, a scenario
where the government can rely on a commitment technology, i.e. where taxes are chosen,
and credibly committed to, prior to investment taking place. Similarly, a value of zero
for the parameter  can be interpreted either as representing a scenario with no pollution
spillovers between countries or a scenario where the two governments manage to internalize
the spillovers by choosing taxes in a coordinated manner. Then, the policy choice obtained
for  =  =0represents the “global” second-best optimal tax, which will be denoted by
wF:25
w
F =  ¡ !; (13)
this is the tax for which the common payo¤ of the two countries is maximized.
23For nA0, a solution with ~ w =( 1¡)¡!@[(1¡)+@(1¡n)] A (1¡)¡!@(1¡) A 0 would
imply ~ w =( 1¡ n)~ w and ~ wA0, an impossibility.
24Trivially, in a scenario where the second-best choice is w =0(i.e., where (1 ¡ ) ¡ ! · 0)n o
credibility problem arises.
25In the rest of our analysis, we shall often refer to wF as the optimal tax. However, the reader show
keep in mind that this is a constrained (second-best) optimum; the unconstrained (…rst-best) optimum—a
Pigouvian tax equal to —could only emerge in the absence of distributional e¤ects (i.e.  =0 ).
9In the absence of any form of coordination, the symmetric policy outcome will involve
a suboptimal tax choice:
w
QF =( 1¡ ) ¡ !@(1 ¡ ) ?w
F> (14)
where the superscript QFstands for “no coordination” (between the two governments and
between each government and its investors). Two types of miscoordination are respon-
sible for the ine¢ciency: (i) vertical miscoordination between government and domestic
investors, resulting in an ex-post optimal choice of taxes below the ex-ante second-best
choice; (ii) horizontal miscoordination between governments, resulting in taxes that fail
to internalize the transboundary emission spillovers. The vertical coordination problem
exaggerates the impact of the distributional costs of taxes on the choice of wQF:  only ap-
pears in the second term and has no impact on wQF if  =0; the horizontal coordination
problem understates the e¤ect of taxes on global environmental damage.
If governments can rely on a commitment technology, i.e.  =0 , the uncoordinated
outcome will feature a tax w =( 1¡ ) ¡ ! ¸ wQF; and since payo¤s are monotonically
increasing in w for w?w F, this will result in a (weak) Pareto improvement. Analogously,
if governments can coordinate their choices ( =0 ), the coordinated, no-commitment
outcome will feature a tax w =  ¡ !@(1 ¡ ) ¸ wQF, which will also result in a (weak)
Pareto improvement. Thus, within a single round of interaction, any form of coordination
is bene…cial, for it leads to the adoption of higher taxes:
Proposition 1 With a single round of interaction, partial coordination—either between
governments or between governments and investors—results in a higher level of taxation
and higher welfare.
In this model, the two forms of miscoordination operate in the same direction: both
bias policies downwards, and can never o¤set each other as they do, for example, in the
problems studied by Rogo¤ (1985a), and Kehoe (1989).
3 Policy Reputation and International Cooperation
under Repeated Interaction
The literature on policy credibility has appealed to the well-known idea that repeated
interaction creates incentives to maintain reputation26 and can therefore help overcome
26Here the term “reputation” is used—somewhat loosely, but consistently with the use in some of
the literature—to refer to policy credibility in the context of a game of complete information. (For a
discussion of reputation in games of incomplete information, see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole
[1996].)
10policy credibility problems, or at least mitigate them.27 As described in Stokey (1989),
when the interaction between each government and its domestic investors is repeated
inde…nitely, time-inconsistency policy problems can be solved by the use of “trigger”
punishment strategies involving a permanent reversion by the private sector to the ex-
pectation of future ine¢cient policies:28 the idea is simply that, if reneging on a policy
promise—even only once—entails a permanent loss of credibility, the prospect of future
losses can be su¢cient to prevent a forward-looking government from going back on its
promises.
The notion that, under repeated interaction between countries, the threat of punish-
ment can be used in support of international cooperation has also been independently
invoked in the international economics literature to rationalize the existence of inter-
national policy coordination agreements, which, in the absence of exogenous enforcing
mechanisms, must be interpreted as being self-enforcing. Intuitively, an agreement to
bind policy at the e¢cient level can be enforced if the one-time gain from cheating on
the agreement is su¢ciently small relative to the discounted future cost of a “policy war”
that would be triggered as a consequence.29
In the problem we are analyzing, if repeated interaction takes place, both of the above
reputation mechanisms are at work. In order to examine the two-way relationship be-
tween the domestic policy credibility problem and the international cooperation problem
under repeated interaction, we shall focus on a dynamic version of the problem, namely
a repeated game where the sequence of choices described in the previous section is re-
peated inde…nitely. We want to study the conditions under which a common choice of the
optimal tax level, wF, can be supported as part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in Nash-
reversion punishment strategies, whereby any deviation from a common tax is followed
by permanent reversion to the Nash equilibrium level of tax of the stage game.30
Consider then a situation where both governments select a tax wF and punish devia-
tions from wF by permanent reversion to wQF.I ft h e yb o t hk e e pt ot h i sc h o i c eo fs t r a t e g y ,
the tax level in both countries will be wF in all periods. If now the government in one
country contemplates a deviation from wF in a certain period, such deviation would lie o¤
the path of play anticipated by all the other players; thus, unlike in the static analysis
27This argument was …rst formulated by Selten (1975).
28Since investment projects are assumed to last only one period, private agents are e¤ectively …nitely-
lived players; nevertheless, their investment choices can be made to depend on past history.
29The …rst paper to apply this idea to model international policy cooperation is Dixit (1987).
30We follow, among others, Bagwell and Staiger (1997), Maggi (1999), and Ederington (2001a,b) in
focusing on Nash-reversion punishment. In the Appendix, we also discuss the use of alternative, non-
stationary, subgame-perfect punishment schemes that can support more severe punishment (as in Abreu
[1988]).
11of Section 2, a deviation from wF in a certain period would not have been anticipated by
investors in the previous period. This implies that the ex-post optimal tax by a deviating
government would be equal to ^ w(wF). Therefore, if the government deviates optimally from
wF, it will experience a payo¤ ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)), which exceeds the cooperative payo¤
¦(wF>w F>Y(wF)) = ¦(wF>Y(wF)). The source of the temptation to deviate is twofold: (i)
since a fraction  of the bene…ts from emission abatement accrue to the other country,
deviating from the optimal tax generates a resource savings in excess of the associated
environmental cost for the deviating country; moreover, (ii) since private abatement re-
sponses are constrained by the installed capacity, the government can lower the tax—and
thus reduce the associated distributional cost—with little e¤ect on abatement.
A deviation from wF by the government, however, would trigger inde…nite reversion
to noncooperation, i.e. the other government would cease to select polices cooperatively
and, at the same time, investors in each country would mistrust their governments forever.
This course of action—with tax levels in the reversion phase being fully anticipated by
investors—results in the lowest possible equilibrium level of taxation in all periods of the
continuation game; since payo¤s are monotonically increasing in the tax, this represents
the worst punishment that can be administered through a stationary punishment strategy
in the continuation game. The associated payo¤ is ¦(wQF>Y(wQF)), which is less than the
cooperative payo¤ ¦(wF>Y(wF)).


















where  is the factor by which both governments discount future payo¤s.31
The above inequality yields a minimum critical discount factor, 
QF,a b o v ew h i c hwF
c a nb es u p p o r t e d( “ QF” stands for “no coordination”):

QF =
^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wF>Y(wF))
^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wQF>Y(wQF))
= (16)
It is useful to examine …rst the limiting cases where only one type of miscoordination
is present: (i)  =0 , A0, where the only coordination problem is between each
31An alternative way of looking at how partial coordination a¤ects repeated strategic interaction is to
focus on the most cooperative tax level that can be supported for a given . In our model, due to the
monotonicity properties of the deviation and punishment payo¤s, the two approaches are equivalent: a
fall in the critical discount factor, for a given cooperative tax, implies that governments would be able to
support a higher cooperative tax, for a given discount factor. However, solving for the minimum discount
factor that can support full cooperation greatly simpli…es the analysis when strategies must satisfy a
renegotiation-proofness requirement (which is the focus of the next section).
12government and its investors; and (ii) A0,  =0 , where the only coordination problem
is between governments.
In case (i), it can be shown that the minimum discount factor 
KF for which wF
can be supported by the use of Nash-reversion punishment strategies (“KF” stands for
“horizontal coordination” between governments) lies between zero and unity (Lemma 1 in
the Appendix). Thus, policy credibility can be supported by repeated interaction between
the government and the investors without relying on international agreements, as long as
the government places a su¢ciently high weight on the future.
In case (ii), due to the linearity of environmental damage function and the quadratic
abatement costs, one can verify that the one-period deviation gain, ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) ¡
¦(wF>Y(wF)), and the loss experienced in every period thereafter, ¦(wF>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wQF>






(where “YF” stands for “vertical coordination” between government and investors).
Thus, in the absence of a domestic commitment problem, the sustainability of inter-
national cooperation does not depend on the size of the pollution spillovers, as long as
these are nonzero. This feature of our model makes it easier to identify how the two
di¤erent coordination problems interact with each other: if, for A0, a change in 
produces a certain e¤ect on 
QF, this e¤ect can be attributed to the interaction between
 and  rather than to a direct e¤ect of  on the sustainability of international policy
coordination.
In both cases (i) and (ii), where only one form of miscoordination is completely absent,
eliminating the other makes it always possible to support wF without restriction on the
degree of impatience (i.e. even for  =0 ). However, this is not generally the case when
some degree of miscoordination remains—as can be seen by comparing cases (i) and (ii)
with a case where both forms of miscoordination are present, i.e. A0, A0 (we shall
r e f e rt ot h i sa sc a s e( i i i ) ) .
Consider, …rst, the comparison between cases (i)— =0 , A0—and (iii)—A0, A
0. It can be shown that, when vertical miscoordination cannot be fully eliminated (A0),
the relationship between the critical discount rate, 
QF, and the spillover parameter, ,
is ambiguous:
Proposition 2 When A0, the minimum discount factor for which a globally optimum
level of taxation, wF, can be supported interaction in a subgame-perfect equilibrium by the
threat of Nash reversion for A0 can be greater than or smaller than the corresponding
value for  =0 .
Proof: see Appendix.
13In some cases eliminating the spillover—or equivalently, a binding horizontal coordina-
tion agreement, represented by a move from A0 to  =0 —reduces each country’s
temptation to lower its taxes, free riding on the other country’s policies, and thus helps
to support optimal levels of taxation; then an international binding agreement ( =0 )
makes it easier to sustain e¢cient policies; and conversely, the need to support interna-
tional cooperation through a self-enforcing agreement (A0) would make it more di¢cult
to do so. In other cases the presence of a positive level of spillover (A0)c a nm a k e
it easier to support e¢cient policies. A positive  makes defections more tempting, but
this e¤ect is partially o¤set by the fact that some of the costs associated with achieving a
globally optimal level of abatement along the equilibrium path of play are sunk. At the
same time, a positive  can also make the punishment for defecting more severe, and this
latter e¤ect can dominate the former. When this happens, it is the very need to support
international cooperation by repeated interaction that can help sustain e¢cient policies.32
In these cases, the presence of transboundary spillovers can help solve the domestic policy
credibility problem; we can then say that an international self-supporting international
agreement (A0) would make it easier to sustain optimal levels of taxation, whereas a
binding agreement ( =0 )w o u l dn o t .
If we restrict our attention to a neighborhood of the limiting case  =0 , A0,t h e
conditions under which a self-enforcing agreement can be helpful to overall cooperation
have a simple characterization:
Proposition 3 For A0, a necessary and su¢cient condition for 
QF to be decreasing
in ,f o r approaching zero, is nwF@(nwF + !) ??1 ¡ !@.
Proof: see Appendix.
Under the conditions stated in Proposition 3, if the spillover is su¢ciently small ( is
su¢ciently close to zero), we have 
QF ?
KF—horizontal miscoordination can help
support e¢cient policies. For this to occur,  must lie within a certain range, i.e. the
policy credibility problem must be signi…cant but not too severe.
Similarly, if we compare cases (ii)—–A0,  =0 —and (iii)—A0, A0—we can
show that, for A0,i n c r e a s i n g from  =0has an ambiguous e¤ect on the prospects
for supporting e¢cient policies:33
Proposition 4 When A0, the minimum discount factor for which a globally optimum
level of taxation, wF, can be supported under repeated interaction in a subgame-perfect
32This can occur even when the international cooperation problem, when looked at in isolation, is more
di¢cult to overcome than the policy credibility problem, i.e. when 
KF A
YF=1 @2.
33Notice that in our model any positive value of  produces a discrete jump in comparison with the
case  =0 :w i t h =0and  =0 , the minimum value of  that makes supporting wF possible is always
 =0 .T h u s ,f o r =0 ,am o v ef r o m =0to A0 always results in a higher minimum .
14equilibrium by the threat of Nash reversion for A0 can be greater than or smaller than
the corresponding value for  =0 .
Proof: see Appendix.
In some cases binding domestic policy commitment—represented by a move from A0 to
 =0 —can help support e¢cient policies because it reduces the short-run temptation to
deviate to lower taxes in order to meet distributional objectives; then, binding mechanisms
of domestic policy commitment ( =0 ) can make it easier to sustain e¢cient policies;
and, conversely, the need to sustain policy reputation (A0) would make it more di¢cult
to do so. In other cases a positive  can make it easier to support optimal levels of
taxation, both because it makes the punishment for deviations more severe and because it
disrupts coordination between each government and its domestic investors: under repeated
interaction defections to unilateral optimal tax choices from a cooperative path are not
anticipated by investors; some of costs associated with the cooperative level of abatement
the e¢cient level of tax are thus sunk, which can make defections less attractive. Here,
it is the very need to sustain policy reputation by repeated interaction with the investors
(A0) that can help sustain e¢cient policies. In these cases, the presence of a domestic
policy credibility problem can help to solve the international policy coordination problem;
we can then say that self-supporting, domestic policy reputation (A0) would make it
easier to sustain international cooperation, whereas binding policy commitment ( =0 )
would not.
If we focus on a neighborhood of the limiting case  =0 , we obtain a sharper predic-
tion:
Proposition 5 For A0 and for  approaching zero, 
QF is decreasing in .
Proof: see Appendix.
If the size of the capital-intensive sector spillover is su¢ciently small ( is su¢ciently close
to zero), vertical miscoordination always helps support e¢cient policies.
It is well understood that in noncooperative games partial coordination amongst a
subset of players can give rise to a more ine¢cient noncooperative outcome.34 Here we
focus on cooperation rather than noncooperation; nevertheless, self-supporting coopera-
tion is the result of noncooperative interaction. Thus, our analysis can be thought of as
providing a counterpart of that general principle in a setting with repeated interaction,
where cooperative choices must be supported by noncooperative equilibrium strategies:
partial coordination does not necessarily improve prospects for overall coordination.
34Krugman (1991), for example, applies this idea to preferential international trade policy coordination,
and shows that the simultaneous formation of customs unions lowers welfare.
15In the policy game we are analyzing, the two di¤erent forms of miscoordination operate
in the same direction, and thus partial coordination always results in more e¢cient policies
within a single round of interaction. Nevertheless, when the game is repeated inde…nitely,
partial binding coordination can become counterproductive. Under repeated interaction,
lack of domestic policy commitment can facilitate international cooperation because it
can make deviations by a country less tempting. International policy spillovers can help
because they can generate a larger vertical miscoordination cost during deviations and
because they make it possible to leverage on this vertical miscoordination e¤ect by way
of horizontal punishment.35 Note that it is even possible for both e¤ects to operate
simultaneously in the same scenario, i.e. for both an increase in  a n da ni n c r e a s ei n
to result in a lower 
QF.36
4 Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria
Although Nash reversion represents a credible threat—since playing wQF inde…nitely is
always an equilibrium strategy in the continuation game—it may be considered implau-
sible: if players can support a more e¢cient tax, then, following an act of defection, why
would they not choose to forgo punishment and instead re-coordinate to an equilibrium of
the continuation game that gives them all a higher continuation payo¤?37 The potential
lack of plausibility of Nash-reversion punishment becomes particularly apparent when we
simultaneously consider two di¤erent forms of miscoordination—as we do here—making
it possible for punishment to be cross-linked.38 Such cross-punishment can imply implau-
35The e¤ect of vertical miscoordination on deviations applies not just to …rst-round deviations but also
to deviations from a stated course of punishment, if cooperation between the punisher and the defector is
required during the punishment phase. Nash-reversion punishment strategies do not rely on this type of
cooperative punishment, but other types of punishment strategies might do so in order to maximize the
punishment that can be administered (e.g., the renegotiation-proof strategies described in Section 4, or
Abreu’s [1988] “optimal penal codes”); with this type of strategies, a larger spillover is even more likely
to help. See the Appendix for a discussion of the case of non-stationary punishment strategies.
36For example, for  close to zero, it is always possible to …nd a  and a n small enough that the
conditions of Propositions 3 and 5 are met, so that 
QF is decreasing in both  and .
37In international trade, countries have sometimes chosen to forgo retaliation even when this was
sanctioned by international trade institutions. For example, the US did retaliate against the EU in
the case of measures concerning meat and meat products, where the WTO had …xed sanctions to the
relatively small amount of US$116.8 million per year; however, it seems unlikely that the EU will retaliate
against the US in the case of the tax breaks granted to foreign sales corporations, where the WTO has
allowed the record amount of retaliation of US$4 billion per year. This is because—as the US trade
representative Robert Zoellick puts it—carrying out the threat “would be like dropping a nuclear bomb
on the trade system”.
38In this respect, our analysis presents some similarities with Ederington (2001a), who looks at the
16sible threats: if, for example, the policy credibility problem, when taken in isolation, is
comparatively less severe than the international cooperation problem, then, when the two
problems are combined, the comparatively more severe punishment associated with the
loss of policy credibility can be used to boost prospects for international cooperation. Yet,
such linked threat does not appear plausible precisely because, in such a scenario, policy
reputation can easily be sustained.
In order to deal with this type of objection, Farrell and Maskin (1989) have proposed
the notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium for in…nitely repeated games. The argument
underlying this re…nement is that the only plausible equilibrium strategies are those that
yield Pareto-undominated continuation equilibria in all relevant subgames, thus elimi-
nating incentives for players to jointly renegotiate a switch to di¤erent strategies upon
entering the punishment phase. This means that the only punishment strategies that
are plausible are those which give some of the players a higher continuation payo¤, once
punishment is triggered, than the payo¤ they would obtain by renegotiating a reversion
to cooperation jointly with the defector.
In the problem under analysis, the set of players includes the two countries’ govern-
ments as well as private investors; the e¤ect of punishment strategies on investors’ payo¤s
must thus also be taken into account in the characterization of renegotiation-proof strate-
gies. This rules out punishment strategies involving a reversion to the no-commitment
tax, wQF: if the government can sustain reputation to begin with, why would it not choose
to revert to the “reputation” tax level wYF =( 1¡)¡! given that this gives all players
(the investors as well as both governments) a higher continuation payo¤?
It can be shown that the following strategy pro…le is renegotiation proof: each country
plays wF as long as the other country does the same; if country l d e f e c t si nag i v e np e r i o d
(and country m does not), then country m (the punisher) will play wYF until the defector
country l (the defector) reverts to wF;a ss o o na sc o u n t r yl has repented by playing wF,
country m forgives the initial defection and returns to playing wF.39 The conditions for


























linkage between two policy instruments a¤ecting one dimension of horizontal strategic interaction (trade),
and with Ederington (2001b), who looks at the linkage between two dimensions of horizontal strategic
interaction (trade and environment).
39This characterization of renegotiation-proof punishment strategies calls into play a number of tech-
nical issues, which are discussed in the Appendix.
17The …rst condition states that the one-shot gain from defection must be less than the
discounted one-shot punishment cost that will be experienced by the defecting country.
The second condition states that reversion must be optimal for the defecting country af-
ter a single period of punishment, i.e. it must not be tempting to postpone repentance.40
The last condition states that the punisher must be better o¤ during punishment than
under cooperation. This last condition is what especially distinguishes a renegotiation-
proof equilibrium. As in the Nash-reversion case, unilateral deviations from the stated
strategies “surprise” domestic investors; however, in the case of renegotiation-proof pun-
ishment strategies, two types of such deviations are relevant: deviations from wF during
the cooperative phase (represented by the defection payo¤ ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) in (18)),
and deviation from “repentance” during in the punishment phase (represented by the
“no-repentance” payo¤ ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wYF)) in (19)).
Condition (20) is always trivially satis…ed, so we can restrict our attention to conditions
(18) and (19). Notice that, with linear damage the di¤erence ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y) ¡ ¦(wF>Y)
is independent of Y . It follows that (18) and (19) are equivalent. We can thus directly




^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wF>Y(wF))
¦(wF>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wF>Y(wYF))
= (21)
Renegotiation-proofness imposes a more stringent plausibility requirement on pun-
ishment threats than subgame perfection alone does: it removes the non-credible threat
of inde…nite reversion to the no-reputation tax, wQF, and only allows for a less severe
but more plausible punishment strategy between countries. As a consequence, it can be
shown that the minimum discount factor for which a globally optimum level of taxation
can be supported under repeated interaction by renegotiation-proof punishment strate-
gies is always smaller than the corresponding minimum discount factor for the case of
Nash-reversion strategies (Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
Proceeding as we did in Section 4 for the Nash-reversion case, we can …rst focus on
situations where only one form of miscoordination is present. When only the domestic
commitment problem is present ( =0and A0), it is straightforward to see that there
are no credible punishment strategies giving investors (the punisher) a higher continuation
payo¤, once punishment is triggered, than the payo¤ they would obtain by renegotiating
a reversion to cooperation jointly with the government (the defector). It follows that
no degree of patience is high enough to solve the domestic policy credibility problem
40This condition is required for the strategy followed by the punished player to be subgame perfect in
the continuation game. Notice that, if wF can actually be sustained in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the continuation game, reversion to anything higher or lower could not be part of a renegotiation-proof
strategy.
18(i.e. 
KF = 1). On the other hand, when only the international coordination problem
is present (i.e., A0 and  =0 ), we obtain, as in the Nash-reversion case, 
YF =
1@2.41 Thus, imposing a renegotiation-proofness requirement does not a¤ect conclusions
with respect to the sustainability of international cooperation, when this is considered in
isolation from the policy credibility problem.
In light of the above, if we compare a scenario where both coordination problems are
present (A0, A0) with a situation where only vertical miscoordination remains
(A0,  =0 ), then we conclude that binding horizontal coordination always makes the
e¢cient policies more di¢cult to sustain (since, for  =0 , wF cannot be supported by any
level of patience). With respect to a neighborhood of the limiting case  =0 ,P r o p o s i t i o n
2 above established that, when equilibrium taxes can be enforced by the use of Nash-
reversion punishment strategies, an increase in transboundary spillovers might help to
solve to the domestic commitment problem. The same conclusion applies to a scenario
punishment strategies must satisfy the renegotiation-proofness requirement; however, it
can be shown that in this case, an increase in the spillover from  =0will always have
such an e¤ect:
Proposition 6 For A0 and  approaching zero, the minimum discount factor for
which a globally optimum level of taxation, wF, can be supported in equilibrium by the use
of renegotiation-proof punishment strategies is always decreasing in .
Proof: see Appendix.
Thus, unlike in the Nash-reversion case, for  su¢ciently small, an increase in 
always raises the punishment more than it does the temptation. The intuition for this
result is that for A0 a larger spillover involves comparatively larger costs of surprising
investors—as in the Nash-reversion case. At the same time, in the renegotiation-proof
case, reversion to the no-commitment, tax wQF, is not a plausible threat, and therefore
the positive e¤ect of a larger  on the punishment plays a comparatively more important
role than it does in the Nash-reversion case.
If we next compare a scenario where both coordination problems are present (A0,
A0) with a situation where only horizontal miscoordination remains ( =0 , A0),
we …nd that the comparison is ambiguous (see Proposition 8 in the Appendix)—a result
analogous to Proposition 4: as in the Nash-reversion case, domestic policy commitment
can make it harder to sustain the e¢cient tax. Notice, however, that, unlike in the Nash-
reversion case, the punishment from deviating from cooperation is now the same in the
41The single-period punishment ¦(wF>Y(wF))¡¦(wF>Y(wYF)) is greater than the Nash-reversion pun-
ishment ¦(wF>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wYF>Y(wYF)), but the latter is applied inde…nitely. In the model, the former
payo¤ di¤erence is equal to twice the latter, and the latter di¤erence is equal to the deviation gain. This
implies 
YF =1 @2 as the in the trigger-strategy case.
19commitment and no-commitment case. Thus, lack of commitment does not raise the
punishment as it does in the Nash-reversion case. Nevertheless, as discussed above, lack
of policy commitment implies that unilaterally optimal defections from cooperation can
be larger but less e¤ective, due to the costs of miscoordinating with the investors. Since
such costs increase in , it follows that if the international spillovers are high enough, it
is easier to enforce an international environmental agreement in the absence of domestic
commitment.
If  is small enough, it can be shown that an increase in  always lowers 
QF—by the
same arguments used to establish Proposition 5 for the Nash-reversion case. Together with
Proposition 5, this result implies that, as long as vertical and horizontal miscoordination
a r en o tt o os e v e r e(  and  are both small but positive), they will work hand-in-hand
to help support e¢cient policies, i.e. 
QF is decreasing in both  and . Renegotiation
proofness rules out vertical punishment, but not the e¤ect of vertical miscoordination
on horizontal punishment; in other words, with renegotiation-proof strategies, vertical
miscoordination cannot be used as a direct threat, but must operate indirectly through
the international spillover.
Imposing a plausibility requirement (renegotiation proofness) on the punishment strate-
gies not only makes e¢cient policies more di¢cult to sustain, but also a¤ects conclusions
qualitatively. In the absence of spillovers—i.e. if a government faces its investors alone—
no plausible form of punishment is available; this means that, as long as a vertical coordi-
nation problem is present, a binding international agreement will always be detrimental,
whereas a self-enforcing agreement will make it easier to sustain e¢cient policies. Thus,
imposing renegotiation proofness tends to skew results towards the conclusion that inter-
national spillovers can make it easier to overcome policy credibility problems, i.e. that
policy credibility can be “imported” by a government from a self-enforcing agreement
with a foreign partner, rather than the reverse.
5 Institution Design
Our previous discussion allows us to draw implications for the structure of institutions—
not necessarily in a normative sense, but rather in the sense of what institutions would
arise through the free choice of independent governments. There are, for example, a
number of institutional commitment devices that governments could rely upon to achieve
some degree of binding policy commitment—such as policy delegation or budgeting rules—
many of which have been discussed in the literature.42
42The role of delegation of authority in monetary policy was …rst studied by Rogo¤ (1985b). Lucas and
Stokey (1983) were …rst to study debt structure as a commitment device. Hence, the choice of whether
or not to adopt a commitment technology may be viewed as being, to a certain extent, endogenous.
20Suppose that in each period governments have the option of adopting a binding pro-
cedure by which taxes will be credibly committed to prior to investment decisions being
made; alternatively, they can forgo commitment and leave the choice of tax to follow
private investment choices.
Also suppose that the decisions of adopting such a procedure precede each round in
which tax choices and investment decisions are made (i.e., countries can fully observe
each other’s institutional choice before selecting taxes). Then, focusing on Nash rever-
sion, the one-shot no-commitment Nash equilibrium cannot be part of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium punishment strategy, because in the case of a full breakdown of coopera-
tion, unilateral commitment is a best response for both countries. This will limit the
punishment that can be credibly administered to a defector.
Nevertheless, countries may adopt strategies which involve no commitment along the
path of equilibrium play, and doing so may make it easier to support cooperation if it
reduces the one-shot gain from reneging on cooperation. In turn, the adoption of the
more e¤ective procedure may be endogenously supported in equilibrium by punishment
strategies dictating that, if one country deviates to the “wrong” procedural choice prior
to selecting taxes, Nash reversion immediately ensues—even before taxes are selected.
As we have discussed earlier, the one-shot deviation gain with commitment can be
greater or smaller than the corresponding deviation gain without commitment. If the
former is larger than the latter; then, cooperation will be more easily supported by pun-
ishment strategies featuring policy commitment in the cooperation phase, whereas if the
reverse is true, forgoing commitment will make it easier to support cooperation, and may
endogenously be chosen in equilibrium. Since the Nash-reversion punishment is always
the same independently of which procedure is used along the equilibrium path of play,
the comparison between commitment and no commitment—in terms of their relative ef-
fectiveness at supporting e¢cient policies—only depends on the e¤ect that commitment
has on the one-shot deviation gain:
Proposition 7 A necessary and su¢cient condition for binding policy commitment to
outperform policy discretion in supporting wF is ¦(wF>Y(wF)) A ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)).43
Such condition applies not only to Nash reversion but also to the renegotiation-proof
case, since even then commitment only a¤ects the minimum  through its e¤ect on the
deviation incentives. Thus, even when a commitment technology is feasible, we may
expect that in the presence of international spillovers, governments may willingly forgo
policy commitment in order to maximize international cooperation chances.
A similar argument can be made with respect to the endogenous choice of a binding
43The relevant conditions on the parameters are the same as those described in the proof of Proposition
8 in the Appendix.
21horizontal coordination arrangement.44 But drawing such a parallel could be deceptive:
while institutional devices for achieving domestic policy commitment may be available,
no analogous institutional devices (short of political union) are available in the interna-
tional arena, and self-enforcing agreements are arguably the only available mechanism for
supporting policy coordination between countries.45
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have explored the two-way linkage between domestic policy credibility
and international policy coordination. We have found that repeated interaction between
countries can add a credible source of punishment that would otherwise not be available,
making it possible to overcome the domestic commitment problem: thus, if policy discre-
tion is retained, internationally uncoordinated policymaking can do better than a single
decisionmaker can. At the same time, the need to maintain policy reputation through
repeated interaction with the private sector can help support international cooperation,
implying that not “tying one’s hands” by means of binding commitment mechanisms can
boost prospects for international cooperation.
We have developed our arguments with speci…c reference to environmental policies—a
case where policy spillovers have a particularly simple structure—but they demonstrate
a more general principle: under repeated interaction, partial binding coordination can be
an obstacle to supporting e¢cient policies, independently of whether or not coordination
is bene…cial when interaction is not repeated. As a consequence, when policies must
be self-enforcing, countries may voluntarily forgo the use of institutional mechanisms for
achieving partial binding coordination even if these are available.46
44Under Nash-reversion punishment strategies, countries will always have an incentive to choose a
horizontal coordination agreement, since lack of coordination can never result in lower deviation incentives
(and the Nash-reversion payo¤ will be independent of institutional choices made along the equilibrium
path of play). In the case of renegotiation-proof strategies, on the other hand, if countries cannot rely
on a commitment technology, they may have an incentive to forgo binding horizontal coordination in
equilibrium, since repeated interaction with a foreign partner is the only mechanism by which e¢cient
policies can be sustained, and may be able to support such a choice.
45The majority of proposals for a World Environmental Organization—as reviewed by Lodefalk and
Whalley (2002)—describe it as an institution for facilitating cooperation rather than as a binding arrange-
ment.
46In relation to the speci…c debate on environmental policy and international environmental treaties,
our analysis suggests that, although domestic environmental policy may su¤er from a credibility problem,
international environmental treaties—if they ever come into compliance—could also serve to help domestic
policy making, reducing the need for direct commitment mechanisms, and possibly even making them
undesirable. On the other hand, if international environmental policy cooperation fails to emerge, direct
means of commitment might be called for and might be expected to arise; and once these are in place,
22Is policy credibility imported or exported? The results of our theoretical analysis sug-
gest that it can ‡ow in both directions, but that whether domestic credibility is achieved by
commitment mechanisms or is the result of reputation, and whether international agree-
ments are binding or self-supporting are both crucial for how we answer this question.
Thus, our interpretation of the pattern shown in Figure 1 hinges on how we interpret do-
mestic policy credibility and international cooperation—as binding or as self-supporting.
Under the latter interpretation, our analysis has shown that credibility can both be im-
ported from a self-enforcing international agreement and exported from a government’s
ability to sustain reputation at home. Moreover, importing and exporting credibility
are not reciprocally exclusive possibilities: self-enforcing international agreements and
the need to sustain policy reputation can complement each other in helping to support
overall coordination.
A number of issues are raised but not addressed by our analysis. For example, if inter-
national cooperation is multilateral, rather than bilateral, then the manner in which par-
tial binding coordination a¤ects countries’ ability to support cooperative policies depends
also on how it a¤ects countries’ ability to support coordinated punishment strategies—an
aspect that is absent in our two-country analysis. Also, our analysis has not addressed the
implications of asymmetries between countries with respect to policy spillovers or with
respect to the severity of the policy credibility problem they face.
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Appendix
Unilateral Ex-post Optimal Policies
The government’s payo¤, as a function of the current choice of tax, w, and of the tax foreseen ex
ante by the private sector, ~ w (i.e. once l = l(~ w) is installed), can be written as




q#[(1 ¡ )y(w)2 + [(1 ¡ n)^ yn(w>~ w)2] ¡ ql(~ w)
= ¡w+( 1¡ )
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The last term represents a sunk cost, which is independent of the current (second-period) choice
of tax.
Given (22), the interior solution for the optimal choice of tax is w0 =( 1¡ ) ¡ !@[(1 ¡
)+@(1 ¡ n)]. The choice of capital-intensive …rms, however, is constrained to be less than
or equal to y = ~ w@# by the installed capacity. Given this constraint, the lowest tax that can
support an abatement level y = ~ w@# by the capital-intensive …rms is identi…ed by the equality
~ w@# = w@[(1 ¡ n)#],w h i c hg i v e sw00 =( 1¡ n)~ w. Raising the tax above this level has no e¤ect
on the abatement choice of capital-intensive …rms, but has a positive e¤ect on the abatement
choice of the other …rms. Thus, for wAw 00, the relevant …rst-order condition for an ex-post
policy optimum is ¡ +( 1¡ )q[(1 ¡ ) ¡ w]@# =0 , which gives w000 =( 1¡ ) ¡ !@(1 ¡ ).
Then, if w000 Aw 00 the government will select w = w000. If, however, w000 ?w 00,t h eg o v e r n m e n tw i l l
select w = w0 if this is less than w00; otherwise, the government will select w = w0:b yd o i n gs o ,i t
can still secure an abatement level of ~ w@# by the capital-intensive …rms while minimizing the
distributional costs associated with the tax. Notice that, as long as the government’s objective
is concave in w,w h e n(1 ¡ ) ¡ !@[(1 ¡ )+@(1 ¡ n)] A (1 ¡ n)~ w we know that welfare
will be increasing in w at w =( 1¡ n)~ w, implying that w00 will be a constrained optimum for the
government. We can therefore express the optimal ex-post tax as





For ~ w = wF =  ¡ !,w eh a v et h r e ep o s s i b l eo p t i m a ld e v i a t i o nr e g i m e s :
251. w00 ?w 000 ?w 0 ! ^ w(wF)=w000, if and only if ? 1;
2. w000 ?w 00 ?w 0 ! ^ w(wF)=w00, if and only if 1 ?? 2;
3. w000 ?w 0 ?w 00 ! ^ w(wF)=w0,i fa n do n l yi fA 2;
where
1 ´
! + n( ¡ 1)( ¡ !)
( ¡ 1)
> 2 ´
n[1 + ( ¡ 1)n]+!( ¡ 1)(1 ¡ n)
[1 + ( ¡ 1)n]
= (24)
Lemma 1 Under binding horizontal coordination ( =0 ), the minimum discount factor, KF,
for which a globally optimum level of taxation can be supported under repeated interaction by
Nash-reversion punishment strategies lies between zero and one.
Proof: When  =0 , the minimum discount factor for which a globally optimum level of taxation
can be supported under repeated interaction is equal to
KF =
^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wF>Y(wF))
^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wQF>Y(wQF))
> (25)
where wF =  ¡ ! A wQF =  ¡ !@(1 ¡ ).S i n c e ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) A ¦(wF>Y(wF)) A
¦(wQF>Y(wQF)) A 0, the numerator in (25) is always smaller than the denominator, and both
are positive, implying 0 ? KF ? 1. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
This proof is by example. Proposition 3 below describes conditions under which KF A QF.
Consider instead the case where 1 ¡  ! @ ??n w F@(nwF + !), implying ^ w(wF)=w000 and









2( ¡ 1) ¡ 2!( ¡ 1) + 2!2( ¡ 2 ¡ 1)
i2 A 0> (26)
implying KF ? QF. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
For  approaching zero, there are only two possible optimal deviation regimes: in the …rst










26In the …rst regime, the deviation payo¤ ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) increases with , the cooperation
payo¤ ¦((wF)>Y(wF)) is independent of , and the Nash-reversion payo¤ ¦(wQF>Y(wQF)) de-






with i0() A 0, j0() · 0,a n di() A ª Aj (). This implies that the numerator in (29)
always increases in  by more than the denominator does, and so CQF@C A 0.I nt h es e c o n d
regime, when nwF@(nwF + !) ??1 ¡ !@,w eh a v e^ w(wF)=w00 and wQF A 0.I n t h i s
case, the deviation payo¤ ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) is independent of , but the Nash-reversion payo¤
¦(wQF>Y(wQF)) is decreasing in , implying CQF@C ? 0. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
This proof is by example. When  =0 ,w eh a v e¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF))¡¦(wF>Y(wF)) = ¦(wF>Y(wF))¡
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i2 ? 0> (30)








2!2 A 0> (31)
and, for a broad range of parameter values, we have QF A YF =1 @2; for example, under
parameterizations for which wQF =0 ,a s approaches unity, QF also tends to unity. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
For A0 and  arbitrarily close to zero, w0 is arbitrarily close to w000, and both are arbitrarily
close to (1¡)¡!; then, since w00 is only selected if it lies between w0 and w000, we can conclude
that ^ w(wF) will be arbitrarily close to (1 ¡ ) ¡ !. We have shown that with quadratic costs
and linear damage the gain to deviating to (1 ¡ ) ¡ ! is the same as the loss from both
countries reverting to that level, if no costs are sunk (proof of Proposition 4). If some of the
costs are sunk, however, the deviation gain is less than the cost of Nash reversion; hence for 
approaching zero, we have QF ? 1@2. 2
Renegotiation-Proof Punishment Strategies
Van Damme (1989) has shown that the following strategy pro…le are renegotiation proof: each
country plays cooperatively as long as the other country plays cooperatively. If country l defects
in a given period (and country m does not), then player m will defect until country l plays
cooperatively. As soon as country l has repented by playing cooperatively, country m forgives
the initial defection and returns to playing cooperatively.
27Van Damme’s arguments are developed for the in…nitely repeated prisoner dilemma with a
discrete strategy space. In such case, the strategy that in‡icts the maximum punishment on the
defector while ensuring that the punisher is better o¤ than under unbroken cooperation involves
the punisher playing her one-shot best response against the defector during the punishment
phase, and the defector adopting a tax wF in excess of her own best response.
With a continuous and unrestricted strategy space, it may be possible to in‡ict more severe
punishment through punishment strategies prescribing that the defector adopt a “repentance”
tax, wU,i ne x c e s so fwF—which would then replace wF in conditions (18) and (19). In our model
speci…cation, however, linear damage implies that deviation gains are independent of the level
of tax in the other country; furthermore, such gains are monotonically increasing in the tax level
from which deviations take place. Hence, since the right-hand sides of (18) and (19) are the
same, equality of the left-hand sides implies that the repentance tax must be equal to wF.
As discussed in the text, a punishment strategy prescribing that the punishing country adopt
at a xwQF in the punishment phase is not renegotiation-proof, because all players would bene…t
from a coordinated move to an alternative punishment strategy featuring wYF instead. Such
alternative strategy would always be a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy of the continuation
game, as the following argument demonstrates. Suppose that deviations from wYF to wQF by
the punishing country are punished by inde…nite Nash reversion; then, if wF can be supported
by a renegotiation-proof punishment strategy, it can also be supported by a Nash-reversion
punishment strategy (Lemma 2), and so can wYF ?w F.
When  is su¢ciently small, then it may be feasible (in the renegotiation-proof sense) and
optimal for punishment to last more than one period. In these cases, the expression we derive
in (21) overestimates the minimum discount factor for which e¢cient policies can be supported
by renegotiation-proof punishment strategies. Nevertheless, even in the case of multi-period
punishment, vertical miscoordination will have an analogously ambiguous e¤ect on the deviation
incentives
Lemma 2 The minimum discount factor QF for which a globally optimum level of taxation
can be supported by Nash-reversion punishment strategies under repeated interaction is always
smaller than the corresponding discount factor when renegotiation-proof punishment strategies
are used.
Proof: In the case of Nash-reversion punishment strategies, QF is de…ned by (16), whereas
in the case of renegotiation-proof punishment strategies, QF is de…ned by (21). The two
expressions have the same denominator. Notice that ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) ¡ ¦(wQF>Y(wQF)) =
¨+(Y (wF)¡Y (wQF))—with ¨ being the di¤erence between the deviation and Nash-reversion
payo¤s, excluding the foreign term—while ¦(wF>Y(wF))¡¦(wF>Y(wYF)) = (Y (wF)¡Y (wYF)).
Since ¨ A 0 and Y (wQF) ?Y(wYF), it follows that the denominator in (16) is larger than the
denominator in (21). 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
A ss h o w ni nt h eP r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 ,w h e n tends to zero, the optimal deviation tax is
either w00 or w000, depending on where  lies. As in the Nash-reversion case, when w00 and wQF A
0, the deviation payo¤ ^ ¦(^ w(wF)>w F>Y(wF)) is independent of , but the Nash-reversion payo¤
28¦(wQF>Y(wQF)) is decreasing in , implying CQF@C ? 0. However, unlike in the Nash-
reversion case, an increase in the international spillover also helps when the deviation tax is








Proposition 8 When A0, the minimum discount factor for which a globally optimum level
of taxation, wF, can be supported by renegotiation-proof punishment for A0 can be greater than
or smaller than the corresponding value for  =0 .
Proof: In the renegotiation-proof case, the only di¤erence between QF and YF comes from the
deviation incentives. In the case of vertical coordination (i.e.  =0 ), the deviation payo¤ is
¦(wYF>Y(wF)) =
(1 ¡ 2)2 ¡ 2! + 2!2
2!
= (33)
Su¢cient conditions the deviation gain to be larger with no commitment (A0)a r e :
1. for the regime where ^ w(wF)=w000,
? 1> A  1 ´ ( ¡ 2!)@(22 ¡ 2! + 2!2); (34)
2. for the regime where ^ w(wF)=w00,
1 ?? 2> A  2 ´
( ¡ n+ n!)2
n( ¡ !)(¡2 + n+2 !¡ n!)
; (35)
3. for the regime where ^ w(wF)=w0,
A 2> A  3 ´
(n ¡ 1)
h
¡ 22 + 22 +(  ¡ !)
¡




¡ 22 + 22 + n( ¡ !)2 + !(2 ¡ !)
i = (36)
2
Non-stationary Subgame-Perfect Punishment Strategies
Abreu (1988) has shown that inde…nite Nash reversion is not necessarily the most e¤ective
subgame-perfect punishment strategy. If punishment is concentrated in the periods that imme-
diately follow defection, the prospect of increased future cooperation may be used to induce the
non-defector to punish the defector more harshly.
Consider the following punishment strategy. Each country plays wF as long as the other
country does the same. If country l defects in period } (and country m does not), then in period
} +1country l plays wF and country m plays wS ?w QF. I ft h e yb o t hd ot h i si np e r i o d} +1 ,
they both revert to wF from period } +2onwards; if country l (the defector) does not play wF
29in period } +1,r e v e r s i o nt owF by both countries is postponed; if country m (the punisher) does
not play wS in period }+1, both countries revert to playing wQF inde…nitely from }+2onward.
The di¤erence between this strategy and the renegotiation-proof strategy described in Section 4
is that it involves the punisher using a tax that is below the unilaterally optimal tax, wQF (and
hence below wYF), which in turn implies a more severe punishment for the defector.
In order for the above punishment strategy to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy of
the continuation game, the defector must have no incentive to deviate at } +1 :





Moreover, the punisher must have no incentive to deviate from wS at } +1 ;t h u st h el o w e s tt a x
that the punisher can be persuaded to adopt is a tax wS ?w QF for which the gain from deviating
at } +1is less than the loss from reverting to wQF rather than wF in future periods, i.e.







The above, when binding, identi…es the lowest sustainable wS. Given this, players would not
defect in period } if





In our model conditions (37) and (39) coincide. The minimum discount factor for which wF can
be supported by the above punishment strategy is then identi…ed by a combination of values 
and wS which satisfy (37) and (39) with equality.
It can easily be shown that the above punishment strategy can outperform Nash reversion.









,f o rwS ?w QF,i m -
plying that the minimum discount factor for which wF can be supported will be less than 1/2.
Notice that, for 0 ??1, the right-hand side of (38) is positive and independent of wS,w h i l e
t h eal e f t - h a n ds i d ei si n c r e a s i n gi nwS for wS ?w QF and is zero at wS = wQF; hence, we can
always …nd a value wS ?w QF that satis…es (38).
With this type of strategies, “cooperation” between the defector and the punisher is required
during the punishment phase. Vertical miscoordination (a larger ) can then help to support wF
not just by making deviations from wF less attractive at }, but also by making deviations from
wS less attractive for the punisher at }+1a n dt h u sb ym a k i n gi tp o s s i b l et os u p p o r tal o w e rwS.
Horizontal miscoordination (a larger ) allows the e¤ect of vertical miscoordination on wS to
translate into a more severe horizontal punishment, since the e¤ect of a lower wS on the defector
increases in .
To illustrate, consider the case  =1 .T h e n a c h o i c e wS =0can be supported. Since all
…rms use capital, if wS =0is expected, no investment will take place; then any ex-post increase
in the tax will have no e¤ect on abatement and produce an adverse distributional e¤ect, and so
the punisher cannot gainfully deviate from wS =0in period } +1 . In turn, the ability to apply
wS =0during punishment will produce a larger e¤ect on the right-hand side of (39) the larger
is .
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